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GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster 
munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine action 
organisations and other human security organisations. We support the ultimate 
goal of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and promoting 
development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 
55 staff members from over 15 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique 
and international centre of mine action expertise and knowledge. Our work is made 
possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 
20 governments and organisations.
C
ov
er
 im
ag
e:
 ©
 A
D
F
A GUIDE TO SURVEY 
AND CLEARANCE 
OF UNDERWATER 
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
4 | Contents
List of acronyms and abbreviations	 6
List of figures	 7
Scope and methodology	 9
INTRODUCTION
Current underwater EO problems 12
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) 12
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) 13
The impact of underwater explosive ordnance 13
Training and equipment requirements 14
Category 1 underwater EO 14
Category 2 underwater EO 16
Category 3 underwater EO 16
UNDERWATER	SURVEY	AND	CLEARANCE	OPERATIONS
Risk management framework 20
Identify risks 21
Risk assessment 22
Develop risk response 24
Control risks 25
Monitor risks 25
Liability considerations 26
Liability in the mine action community 26
Types of liability insurance 27
Underwater liability considerations 27
CONTENTS
Contents | 5
Non-Technical Surveys 28
General policies and procedures 28
Case study: Cambodia 31
Background 31
Successes  32
Challenges 33
Analysis  34
Technical Surveys 34
General policies and procedures 34
Technical survey equipment 35
Case study: GICHD Underwater Equipment Trials 39
Background 39
Successes  39
Challenges 41
Analysis  43
Underwater EO clearance and site management 44
General policies and procedures 44
Clearance options 45
Site Management options 45
Case study: Operation RENDER SAFE 46
Background 46
Successes  47
Challenges 49
Analysis  50
CONCLUSIONS	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	 51
List of additional resources 54
6 | List of acronyms and abbreviations
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADF
Australian Defence Force
AUV
Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicle
AXO
Abandoned Explosive 
Ordnance
CDT
Clearance Dive Team
CHA
Confirmed Hazard Area
COI
Contact of Interest
CONOPS
Concept of Operations
DGPS
Differential Global Positioning 
System
EO
Explosive Ordnance
EOD
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EMI
Electro-magnetic Induction 
(also Pulse Induction)
GICHD
Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining
GIS
Geographic Information 
System
GWHF
Golden West Humanitarian 
Foundation
HMA
Humanitarian Mine Action
IMAS
International Mine Action 
Standard
MCM
Mine Countermeasures
NTS
Non-technical Survey
R/I
Reacquire/Identify
RSIPF
Royal Solomon Islands 
Police Force
ROV
Remotely Operated Vehicle
SBAS
Satellite-based augmentation 
systems
SBP
Sub-bottom Profiler
SCUBA
Self-contained Underwater 
Breathing Apparatus
S/C/M
Survey/Classify/Map
SES
Ukraine Special Emergency 
Services
SHA
Suspect Hazard Area
SI
Solomon Islands
SSS
Side-scan Sonar
TS
Technical Survey
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNCLOS
UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea
UNESCO
UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation
UXO
Unexploded Ordnance
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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of this guide aligns with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 
09.60 and is intended to augment the general information provided in the standard. 
Information in this guide applies to underwater explosive ordnance (EO) in the 
territorial waters of a nation (generally within 12 nautical miles of shore) and 
inland waters; this includes coastal waters, lakes, rivers, ports, harbours, ponds 
and canals below the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW) mark to a water depth of 
50 metres or less. Clearance of areas deeper than 50 metres of water fall outside 
humanitarian operations as defined in IMAS 09.60 due to the limited humanitarian 
and socio-economic impact of deeper water sites.
This guide focuses on providing a collection of current policy and best practices 
used in survey and clearance of underwater explosive ordnance. Specific cases are 
used; they provide examples and analysis. It is not intended to be a comprehensive 
database of policies and practices; it provides national authorities and mine action 
organisations with guidance to better understand the issues and complexities of 
underwater EO survey and clearance operations.
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In 2014, the GICHD conducted a survey of countries impacted by underwater 
explosive ordnance (EO). Through examining documentation and direct contact 
with national authorities, they found that EO affected a minimum of 64 countries. 
Of these, 33 are developing nations who have requested assistance in mitigating its 
impact. The mine action community will continue to encounter sites contaminated 
with underwater EO; the policies and practices discussed in this guide will assist 
in providing an understanding of the problems and potential solutions.
CURRENT UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE PROBLEMS
Underwater EO is located in inland waters, territorial waters and international 
waters throughout the world. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) from sea 
dumping after the First and Second World Wars, along with unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) scattered in the littorals from dozens of other conflicts and wars, has 
resulted in millions of tons of ordnance in global waters. Military air and naval 
bombardments, naval mining operations, military firing ranges, sea-dumping of 
munitions, ship and aircraft wrecks have all contributed to the problem. EO is a 
direct hazard to coastal communities, maritime development, off-shore energy 
industry, the commercial fishing industry, tourism and more. National militaries 
have maintained, until recently, almost exclusive expertise in dealing with these 
hazards. This guide shares policies and practices in order to disseminate these 
largely unknown methods of underwater EOD operations.
Unexploded	Ordnance	(UXO)
UXO is ordnance that has been subjected 
to an arming sequence but has failed to 
explode. Typically, this occurs through 
a normal firing sequence. A conserva-
tive estimate is that modern ordnance 
has a misfire rate of ten percent but 
historically, a thirty percent misfire 
rate was more common during the 
world wars. Most UXO is from war. 
War and resultant UXO have affected 
most countries at one time or another. 
Germany, France, United Kingdom, 
Japan and other countries still routinely 
recover and dispose of thousands of tonnes of UXO each year from the Second 
World War era. Firing ranges are another source of UXO. Bombing and artillery 
ranges are common throughout the globe to prepare for war. As they become 
Figure 1 Australian CDT preparing explosive 
charges to dispose of UXO.
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de-commissioned or abandoned, the UXO left behind remains a deadly hazard. 
Progress has been achieved in clearing land-based UXO sites but underwater sites 
have received less attention.
Abandoned	Explosive	Ordnance	(AXO)
AXO is also very common throughout 
the globe. AXO is ordnance that may 
or may not have been primed, fuzed, 
armed or otherwise prepared for 
use. Sea dumping of ordnance was 
a standard practice until the 1970s, 
with most occurring immediately after 
the Second World War. Dumping of 
millions of tonnes of ordnance into 
global waters took place during that 
period. Ship and aircraft wrecks also 
contain substantial amounts of AXO. 
Thousands of these wrecks remain 
along coasts, in lakes and rivers. Some AXO sites are in deep water with little 
hazard to coastal communities. Those in shallow coastal or inland waters result 
in considerable humanitarian and socio-economic impact.
THE IMPACT OF UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
The impact of underwater EO should 
be the pr imar y determinant of 
action required at contaminated 
sites. Unfortunately, it is not widely 
under stood. This is primarily due to 
under water ordnance being often 
out-of-sight. Accessibility is normally 
limited to those conducting activities 
on or under the water. Assessments 
should analyse those humanitarian, 
socio-economic and environmental 
factors which have an impact on EO 
sites. Assessments should be included 
in the planning phase to determine if 
impact warrants the time, risk and effort required to survey and clear the ordnance. 
For sites with no or limited impact, it may be prudent to monitor the area until 
Figure 3 A GICHD advisor assisting Ukraine 
with an impact assessment of underwater 
areas along the Black Sea coast.
Figure 2 Japanese depth charges in Koror 
Harbour, Republic of Palau.
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changes require action. There are three main impact criteria: humanitarian, socio-
economic and environmental impact. Impact assessments should be conducted in 
coordination with local authorities who can access information, reporting and records.
TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
Organisations conducting underwater 
EO survey and clearance include NGOs, 
commercial organisations and military 
forces. Each of these organisations has 
knowledge and experience in certain 
aspects of underwater survey and 
clearance operations. Few, however, 
understand the overall complexities 
and the training and equipment 
requirements needed. The following 
paragraphs provide a basic structure 
for categorising underwater EO and 
determining needed resources.
There are many methods of categorising underwater EO but the categories 
described below are useful when looking at training and equipment needed for 
survey and clearance operations. Categories are different based on the ordnance’s 
location (buried or protruding) and the water depth. In many cases, more than one 
category will be relevant. For instance, underwater EO may be buried (Cat 2) in a 
water depth of greater than 20 metres (Cat 3). In this case, training and equipment 
requirements for both Category 2 and 3 will be required.
Category	1	underwater	EO
Definition: underwater EO not buried 
beneath the seabed and in less than 20 
metres of water.
Generally, Category 1 underwater EO 
can be surveyed and cleared using 
manual search techniques with simple 
diving systems. Burial of underwater 
EO is dependent on seabed type and 
environmental conditions at each site. 
Some sites have very low burial rates, 
Figure 4 A GICHD advisor conducting a 
capability assessment of Ukraine SES divers.
Figure 5 Manual survey and clearance 
procedures being performed by Ukraine SES.
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while at other sites the rate is very high. It is important for non-technical surveys 
to assess burial rates in order to determine training and equipment requirements 
for follow-on technical survey and clearance operations.
Main equipment requirements for Category 1 operations:
• Small boats suitable for scuba diving;
• Scuba or similar diving equipment
• Diver communication system
• Personal dive equipment (wet/dry suits, fins, masks, knives, etc.)
• Underwater search systems:
 } Lines, clumps and buoys
 } Underwater metal detector
• Maritime differential GPS
• Lift bags to recover EO
• Underwater demolition equipment
• Emergency medical equipment
• Geographic information system (GIS) to document survey and clearance
Basic training requirements:
• Basic dive training
• EOD level 1, 2 and 3 training
• Diving medicine and treatment
• Dive supervisor training
• Small boat coxswain training
• Marine navigation training
• Underwater search techniques
• Underwater demolition procedures
• Maintenance and certification of diving life support systems
16 | Introduction
Category	2	underwater	EO
Definition: underwater EO buried below the seabed and in greater than one metre 
of water.
It generally requires a technical survey with advanced sensors such as electro-
magnetic induction (EMI) systems or magnetometers. Manual search techniques 
are not effective in areas where underwater EO burial is high. EMI systems or 
magnetometer survey systems map contamination in order to improve safety, 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations.
Main equipment requirements for Category 2 operations:
• Small boats suitable for technical survey operations
• Maritime differential GPS
• Sonar (boat-towed or AUV)
• EMI system or Magnetometer (boat-towed or AUV)
• Underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) – optional
• Geographic information system (GIS) to document technical survey
• Software for conducting post-mission analysis
Basic training requirements:
• Technical survey system training (towed/AUV, sonar/magnetometer)
• Small boat coxswain training
• Marine navigation training
• Technical survey mission planning
• Post-mission analysis training (sonar, magnetic anomaly interpretation)
• Software training
Category	3	underwater	EO
Definition: underwater EO located in greater than twenty metres of water depth or 
in situations where ordnance is located inside the compartment of a shipwreck.
Category 3 underwater EO generally requires the use of advanced dive training and 
equipment. A professional surface-supplied diving system and support equipment 
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is required when conducting search and clearance work at a greater depth than 
20 metres of water or within a shipwreck.
Main equipment requirements for Category 3 operations:
• Diving support vessel (typically 40 metres or more in length)
• Surface-supplied diving equipment
• Dive communications system
• Personal dive equipment (wet/dry suits, fins, masks, knives, etc.)
• Transportable diver recompression chamber
• Underwater search systems:
 } Lines, clumps and buoys
 } Underwater metal detector
• Underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) – optional
• Maritime differential GPS
• Lift bags or davits to recover EO
• Excavation equipment (pumps to dredge mud, sand and debris)
• Underwater demolition equipment
• Emergency medical equipment
• Geographic information system (GIS) to document survey and clearance
Basic training requirements:
• (all Category 1 training)
• Surface-supplied dive training
• Diving supervisor training – surface supplied diving
• Dive recompression chamber operations and maintenance
• Treatment of dive casualties
18
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The approach described in this section derives from the principles and standards 
developed in the mine action community. Tactics, techniques and procedures from 
military underwater mine countermeasures (MCM) operations, and the currently 
available technology, have been included in this guide.
RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The framework outlined in Figure 6 displays the integration of risk management 
into the overall mine action process for underwater EO survey and clearance 
operations. The following paragraphs discuss each step of the risk management 
process.
Identifying	risks
Part of the General Mine Action Assessment includes a desk study of the history of 
an underwater EO site. It should identify the underwater EO by providing a general 
description of the location, type of EO and reason for its presence. Collected 
information may come from national archives, military databases, war records, 
range maps, records of disposal, vessel logs documenting activities, nautical 
charts, sailing publications, records of previous incidents of recovered munitions, 
public documents, databases developed by private researchers, the recreational 
diving community and other relevant sources. This information will feed into a 
more detailed study during a Non-Technical Survey (NTS).
Before progressing to a NTS, an impact assessment should be conducted to 
determine if the risks identified justify further effort. An impact assessment analyses 
humanitarian, social, economic and environmental risks of an underwater EO site. 
For example, determining the likelihood of both encountering underwater EO at 
a site and detonation of the EO with its consequences would provide authorities 
with the information needed to decide whether resources, effort and operational 
risk should be employed to survey and clear an underwater EO site. The threshold 
for taking action is different based on the risk tolerance of the authorities involved. 
An NTS should only proceed when authorities decide that they should expend 
additional effort to reduce the impact of an underwater EO site. The ‘Non-Technical 
Survey’ section of this guide describes it further.
NTS refers to on-site collection and analysis of data on the presence, type, 
distribution and surrounding environment of EO contamination. This is used to 
define better where EO is present, and where it is not. It should follow a desk 
study by building on data and information to provide a more detailed view of the 
problem. It will confirm whether there is evidence of a hazard, identify the type 
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RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Risk	management		
process
Underwater	EO		
survey/clearance	process
Mine	
action	
phases
1. Identify risks
•  Type of EO
•  Condition of EO
•  Quantity and density of EO
•  General EO location
A. General mine action assessment
•  Desk study
•  Review of policy, regulations and laws
•  Underwater EO impact assessment
•  Capability assessment
•  Select and prioritise areas for  
survey/clearance
•  Specify survey and clearance 
requirements and responsibilities
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2. Risk assessment
•  Probability of encountering 
underwater EO
•  Severity of impact 
of underwater EO
3. Develop risk response
•  Avoid, Transfer, Mitigate 
or Accept
B. Non-Technical Survey (NTS)
•  Collect and analyse survey information
C. Technical Survey (TS)
•  Survey site to defined requirements
D. Enabling activities
•  Develop capabilities and establish 
funding
P
rep
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4. Control risks
•  Direct and manage work
•  Monitor and control work
•  Reassess risk 
E. Operations
•  Remove and dispose of underwater EO
•  Monitor and inspect (quality assurance)
C
learan
ce
5. Monitor risks
•  Monitor residual risks 
F. Closeout
•  Inspect cleared sites (quality control)
•  Clearance documentation
•  Post-project review
P
ost-clearan
ce
FIGURE	6
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and extent of hazards and defines, as far as possible, the perimeter of the actual 
hazardous areas without physical intervention. Sources of information include 
police, military, hospitals, local authorities, fishermen, dive shops, etc. Information 
from the desk study and the NTS feeds into the risk assessment process.
Risk	assessment
The purpose of a risk assessment is to assess risks posed by underwater EO 
based on the probability of a threat occurring and its potential severity. It should 
be applied to both the underwater EO site and the secondary risks that arise 
as a direct result of implementing a risk response (see next section). Hazards 
at a site directly related to underwater EO may be beach-going, scuba diving, 
dredging, port development, bridge construction, etc. Secondary hazards related 
to mitigation operations may be small boat operations, towed magnetometer 
survey, diving operations, ROV operations, in situ EO disposal, recovery and 
transport of EO, etc. An example of a four-step risk assessment process is shown 
below. It can be used to assess and mitigate underwater EO and the secondary 
risks from implementing a risk response.
Example hazard activity: in situ EO disposal operations of scattered underwater 
EO near a port facility.
Step 1: identify hazard (see matrix developed in step 4 below).
• Hazards are physical activities conducted on site.
Step 2: identify associated threats (see matrix developed in step 4 below).
• Threats are defined by historic evidence and likelihood of occurrence.
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Step 3: develop a risk assessment matrix
Risk	assessment	matrix
Probability
Frequency of occurrence over time
A B C D
Likely Probable May Unlikely
S
everity
E
ffect o
f h
azard
I
Damage to critical infrastructure, 
equipment or environment;  
death of personnel
1 1 2 3
II
Significantly degraded infrastructure, 
equipment or environment; severe 
injury of personnel
1 2 3 4
III
Degraded infrastructure, equipment 
or environment; minor injury of 
personnel
2 3 4 5
IV
Little or no impact to infrastructure, 
equipment or environment; minimal 
injury of personnel
3 4 5 5
Risk assessment codes: 1 Critical 2 Serious 3 Moderate 4 Minor 5 Negligible
Step 4: institute a risk mitigation strategy, then reassess (example below)
Hazard Threat Initial	
RAC
Mitigations Reassess	
RAC
In situ EO 
disposal
Damage to port facility 
infrastructure by 
underwater explosive 
shock wave.
2(IIB) Move ships and other 
critical infrastructure out 
of hazard area; ensure 
pipelines are not within 
hazard area.
4(IID)
In situ EO 
disposal
Swimmers or divers killed 
or injured by underwater 
explosive shock wave.
2(IC) Warn local community 
of operations; coordinate 
with local authorities; 
establish cordon around 
hazard area.
4(IID)
In situ EO 
disposal
Damage to marine 
environment (coral, fauna, 
sea life, etc.)
3(IIIB) Assess potential damage 
area around each site to 
determine if damage is 
acceptable.
4(IIIC)
In situ EO 
disposal
Marine mammals killed 
or injured by underwater 
explosive shock wave.
2(IC) Establish cordon around 
hazard area and designate 
personnel to watch for 
marine mammals.
4(IID)
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After assessing all hazards in the four-step process, authorities should have a 
clear understanding of the risk associated with both the underwater EO and the 
secondary risk response options. With both the risk assessment and the impact 
assessment complete, authorities are ready to develop a risk response.
Developing	risk	responses
An organisation’s risk tolerance, operational capability and available funding will 
be the primary influence on risk response options. There are four basic options to 
consider when developing a risk response:
1. Avoid risk by limiting activities at the underwater EO site. Avoidance is a 
good option in areas that have little activity and no plans for development 
or activities that would produce an intolerable risk.
2. Transfer risk by shifting responsibility to another organisation. For instance, 
in an area planned for commercial development, underwater EO clearance 
operations could be included in the commercial development project.
3. Mitigate risk by conducting underwater EO clearance operations. 
Ideally, clearance is the best outcome because it removes the source of 
underwater EO risk but clearance capability or available funding may limit 
an organisation’s ability to conduct clearance.
4. Accept risk by putting reactive procedures in place to respond when 
finding underwater EO. Risk acceptance is typical with residual contami-
nation. Even in areas where underwater EO has been cleared a residual 
risk of encountering EO will remain. It is common for marine dredging 
operations to accept underwater EO risk when ordnance is smaller than 
a specified diameter. Magnetometers or other detection technologies are 
usually applied to detect EO during dredging, followed by pre-planned 
response procedures to remove and dispose of the detected EO.
Authorities should analyse the following criteria when considering risk response 
options:
a.	 humanitarian, environmental, social and economic impact data provided in 
the impact assessment;
b.	 primary risk of the EO at the site;
c. secondary risks that arise as a direct result of implementing a risk response;
d. residual risk remaining after risk response;
e. available underwater EO survey and clearance capabilities;
f. funding available for clearance.
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Before developing a risk response, authorities should understand their organisa-
tion’s underwater EO survey and clearance capabilities or the costs associated 
with contracting a commercial company to complete the work. In many instances, 
an organisation’s capacity or the available funding may limit risk response options. 
Authorities should use information from the impact and risk assessments to 
develop an appropriate risk response. In some cases, the risks of conducting 
clearance operations will outweigh the potential humanitarian, environmental, 
social or economic benefits. However, it is possible to reduce operational risk to an 
acceptable level when sufficient resources are available. Conversely, if authorities 
decide to forego clearance, measures should be put in place to avoid or manage 
the underwater EO site. Additional information about site management is included 
later in this guide in ‘Underwater EO Clearance and Site Management’.
Control	risks
Controlling risk involves directing and managing work by implementing risk 
response plans, tracking identified risks and identifying new risks. The information 
collected from work performance data enables routine risk reassessments to 
improve the effectiveness of risk response plans continually. In some cases, 
corrective action may dictate an alternative risk response.
Monitor	risks
Residual risk is probable at most underwater EO sites; therefore, post-clearance 
inspection of EO sites may be necessary. Residual risk is the risk remaining 
following the application of ‘all reasonable effort’ to identify, define, and remove 
underwater EO through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance. 
It is minimised when competent organisations follow approved procedures and 
processes. It is possible to quantify residual risk by monitoring areas to identify 
any incidents, accidents or evidence of missed items. Confidence in the clearance 
process can be maintained through the results of such monitoring and areas 
requiring improvement can be identified.
In the case of response plans that include avoiding or accepting the EO risk, 
monitoring and active management will also be necessary. Authorities should 
establish a safety perimeter around known underwater EO sites and prohibit 
activities in the area that would adversely risk disturbing the EO.
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LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
The mine action community have developed well-established policies, practices 
and guidelines to address liability over the last two decades. Liability considerations 
apply as equally to underwater EO survey and clearance operations as for 
traditional land-based clearance operations. Policies, standards and principles of 
liability within mine action are outlined below.
Liability	in	the	mine	action	community
Liability refers to any legal responsibility, duty or obligation that a country, 
organisation or individual may have. A well-documented, transparent, evidence-
based approach to underwater EO survey and clearance operations, which 
demonstrates the application of ‘all reasonable effort’, provides the primary 
mechanism for addressing questions of liability; authorities at all levels then can 
have the confidence to make appropriate decisions. It is important that national 
authorities develop policies that detail liability aspects, including transfer of liability 
from the underwater survey and/or clearance organisations to government or local 
communities when certain criteria have been fulfilled. The following principles 
should apply:
a.	 Underwater EO contamination is firstly and ultimately a national responsibility. 
National authorities should accept accountability and liability for victims 
and areas impacted by underwater EO. This includes known, as well as 
unknown, areas and areas that have been cleared and handed over to the 
national authority or local population. An underwater EO survey and/or 
clearance organisation is considered to be liable for injuries only when it is 
directly and currently responsible for an affected area. Proof of the validity 
of this claim will still be required on a case-by-case basis.
b.	An agreement that details the underwater EO survey and clearance plan 
implies that all stakeholders agree on the definition of ‘all reasonable effort’. 
Identifying and quantifying these efforts will help to prevent disputes 
related to liability issues.
c.	 If an underwater EO survey and clearance plan has been approved by a 
government, then appropriate application of the principles by operators and 
acceptance of handover by the national authority implies that the level of 
risk of underwater EO contamination in the area after survey or clearance is 
deemed tolerable by the government.
d.	 If an investigation shows that the agreed underwater EO survey and clearance 
plan had been implemented appropriately and thus the organisation had 
made all reasonable effort to ensure that the area was safe before handover, 
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the organisation will, in principle, not be liable for missed underwater EO 
contamination or accidents. Additional guidance on the conduct of 
investigations is provided in IMAS 10.60.
e.	 National policy or contractual agreements should clarify liability for dealing 
with items found after underwater EO survey and clearance.
Types	of	liability	insurance
Evidence of appropriate levels of liability insurance during operations should 
be obtained by organisations performing underwater EO survey and clearance 
operations. A brief description of the types of insurance is provided below:
a.	 Professional liability insurance: provides indemnity for the insured 
against loss arising from claims made for error, omission or negligent act 
committed in the conduct of consultancy or contracted service.
b.	 Employer’s liability insurance: provides coverage to a business or 
organisation for liability for employees in the case of work-related bodily 
injury or disease. Underwater EO survey and clearance operations require 
many types of work that involves risk. Employers should adequately insure 
employees for risks involved in diving, explosive handling and disposal, 
small boat operations and many other risks identified during the risk 
management process.
c.	 Public liability insurance: provides protection against claims of personal 
injury or property damage that a third party may have suffered. Policies to 
address third party liability should detail:
1. personal injury of a third party;
2. damage to third party property and infrastructure.
Underwater	liability	considerations
Organisations must also understand liability consideration with respect to the 
marine environment. Some issues include:
a.	Marine mammals and protected marine species: marine mammals are 
particularly susceptible to pressure resulting from an underwater explosion. 
In many parts of the world, there is designated protection for marine mammals 
and other species. Organisations must understand regulatory requirements 
to comply with national and local policies to protect these species.
b.	Marine pollution and damage to the marine environment: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) delineates rights and 
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responsibilities of nations in their use of global waters. It institutes guidelines 
for business and the management of the marine environment and 
resources. Article 192 generally obliges signatories to ‘protect and preserve 
the marine environment’.
c.	 Underwater cultural heritage sites and human remains in ships and 
aircraft: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) Convention for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
has established that ‘States Parties shall ensure that proper respect is given 
to all human remains located in maritime waters’. It also states, ‘Activities 
directed at underwater cultural heritage shall avoid the unnecessary 
disturbance of human remains or venerated sites’. As the wrecks of ships 
and aircrafts often still contain human remains they must be approached 
with respect. This includes proper treatment of discovered human 
remains and notification of local authorities for preservation and recovery. 
Preservation of historic sites must also occur, to the greatest extent 
possible, when balanced with the primary and secondary hazards of the 
underwater EO.
Detailed discussions and agreements on risk and liability should take place 
between underwater EO survey and/or clearance organisations, and national 
authorities before commencing operations.
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEYS
General	policies	and	procedures
The application of NTS methods to 
underwater EO survey and clearance 
may be more difficult than land-based 
operations due to the dynamic nature 
of the marine environment. IMAS 08.10 
presents the basic NTS methodology 
that should be applied but procedures 
have to be adapted to the underwater 
environment.
An NTS will confirm whether there is 
evidence of a hazard or not, identify 
the type and extent of hazards and 
define the perimeter of the actual hazardous areas, without physical intervention. 
In addition to these general criteria, the humanitarian, environmental, social 
Figure 7 A GICHD advisor discussing 
underwater EO in Palau.
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and economic impact of the underwater EO should be analysed to determine if 
additional effort is necessary for clearance. In many cases, underwater sites do 
not pose a significant hazard and management of them may not require clearance. 
For example, an isolated underwater dump site with abandoned explosive 
ordnance (AXO) may not pose a significant hazard or impact local communities 
or development; therefore, the site should be monitored or managed instead of 
expending clearance effort.
Another aspect of underwater NTS is the need to conduct a site survey. 
Information collected will be critical for follow-on underwater technical survey 
and clearance operations. Underwater operations are more complex and dynamic 
that land-based operations. In addition to the standard information gathered during 
a land-based NTS (see IMAS 08.10), information about annual weather conditions, 
water depth, tidal fluctuations, sediment type, currents, underwater obstructions, 
shipwrecks, bottom clutter, seasonal maritime activities, dangerous marine life, 
endangered wildlife or marine life, historical sites, cultural sites, oil/gas pipelines, 
ports, boat ramps and other infrastructure information should be collected. An 
individual country or site will always need to develop more detailed requirements.
A non-technical survey:
a.	 assesses whether areas are contaminated by ERW, or to refine the limits 
of previously reported hazardous areas;
b.	 cancels incorrect reports of EO;
c.	 identifies socio-economic and threat factors that may influence future 
priority-setting;
d.	 collects information about accidents, the type and pattern of hazards, 
water depth, bottom composition, marine life, ecological environment, local 
infrastructure, the security situation and other factors that may influence 
priority setting and method of following up with additional support.
A non-technical survey may further serve as a planning tool for future efforts 
(i.e. technical survey and/or clearance).
The starting point of a NTS typically involves a desk study. Similar to a land-
based NTS, information is analysed from sources such as historical records, police, 
military, hospitals and provincial authorities. However, an underwater NTS must 
also include information from local fishermen, dive shops, marine businesses, 
coastal communities and others with knowledge of the area. Historical research 
may also provide unique challenges; information is often located in nautical charts, 
ships logs and other naval records.
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The environmental conditions at the site, type of EO, method of delivery and 
available information directly relate to the ease of defining and refining limits of 
a suspect hazard area (SHA) or a confirmed hazard area (CHA). An example of 
a relatively simple underwater NTS would involve an intact shipwreck in which 
historical records document the EO cargo, nautical charts document the wreck, 
and local authorities or marine businesses have evidence of the EO through 
photographs or other documentation. Precise boundaries of a CHA can be 
defined around the shipwreck or within specific compartments of the wreck 
using this information. Aircraft wrecks, underwater EO dump sites and other AXO 
sites can often be defined in a similar manner. There are problems, however, 
when environmental conditions move or bury EO. Some environments, for 
example, lakes, are static, while others, such as swift rivers, are very changeable. 
Understanding the impact of environmental conditions on the EO is an essential 
factor in some underwater NTS.
At battle or bombing sites, the NTS process may be less precise, thereby requiring 
definition of a larger SHA or CHA. The typical NTS process of research and 
surveying local communities, businesses and authorities will refine the hazard area. 
However, organisations cannot expect the precision of land-based surveys in some 
cases. The hazard area requiring technical survey and clearance can be further 
refined by reducing underwater areas that would not be impacted by activities 
planned for the site. For example, an underwater CHA at a river site may only 
require technical survey and clearance around the area of a bridge construction 
project. The portion of the CHA not cleared should be properly managed to ensure 
hazardous activities are prohibited within the remaining CHA.
The case study presented below will illustrate the complexity of the underwater 
NTS process and the need to adapt to the area impacted by underwater EO.
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CASE STUDY: CAMBODIA 1
Background
During the Vietnam War, ordnance supplies moved between northern and 
southern Vietnam by rivers in eastern Cambodia. Between 1970 and 1975, 
barges and boats carrying ordnance were often targeted and sunk.
In 2011, information provided by local authorities and a scrap metal hunter 
led Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF) to the location of two 
sunken boats on the Tonle Sap River near Kampong Chhang. GWHF was 
able to pinpoint the location of the wrecks and in May–June 2011, salvage of 
eleven metric tons of U.S. ordnance occurred. Following further research, they 
found evidence of nearly two hundred such sites in the rivers of Cambodia. 
1 Case study information is based on discussions with GWHF personnel and the report: 
Non-Technical Surveys to Investigate the Level of UXO and Ordnance Contamination in 
the Mekong, Tonle Sap, Sekong, Sesan and Sre Pok Rivers in Cambodia by Golden West 
Humanitarian Foundation, Marcel Durocher and Heang Sambo, April 2015.
Figure 8 Approximate locations of sunken supply vessels in the Mekong,  
Tonle Sap, Sekong, Sesan and Sre Pok rivers.
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The estimated suspect hazard area totalled approximately one billion square 
metres. Based on available technology and operational limitations, a technical 
survey of the entire area would have taken more than a decade to complete. 
As a result, GWHF developed a NTS methodology to reduce the area required 
for technical survey operations.
Successes
GWHF used NTS methodology between 2011–2015 along the Mekong, 
Tonle Sap, Sekong, Sesan and Sre Pok rivers in eastern Cambodia. The first 
stage of the process involved historical research to detail the problem and 
understand the operations. Declassified U.S. military reports provided 
bombing data and information on military operations. Research of news 
articles and documentaries by correspondents was also undertaken. The desk 
study provided valuable insight into when and where attacks took place 
and how each of the belligerents sunk the vessels. The research identified 
197 vessels sunk during the period with approximate locations but the 
information was not yet accurate enough to reduce the size of the survey 
area for the technical survey process.
GWHF then developed an interview process to obtain additional information 
from villages along the shores of the rivers and from people earning their living 
on the rivers. The most valuable information came from fishermen, itinerant 
traders and scrap metal hunters. Individuals, who would have had direct 
knowledge of the attacks during 1970–1975, were preferred for interview. 
Through early interviewing experience, GWHF learned that a sampling density 
of one interview per five-kilometre stretch of river was sufficient. Additional 
interviews were conducted at approximately each kilometre to better define 
the area of the sunken vessel after a positive response about a sunken vessel 
was obtained. They found, after follow-on technical surveys, that information 
from two or more interviews about a sunken vessel site produced very 
accurate locations.
Based on the inability of vessels transporting equipment and supplies to 
navigate in shallow waters some of the areas were reduced in size. In other 
areas, interview-sampling density was lower because of the precise 
information provided by scrap metal hunters. Many of the sunken vessels 
and cargo were salvaged by Vietnamese scrap metal companies between 
1982–1987 and again in 1997–2003 from the Tonle Sap, Mekong, Sekong 
and Sre Pok rivers: approximately sixty to seventy vessels were recovered. 
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Cambodian scrap metal hunters also salvaged some sites. In one instance, 
Cambodian authorities apprehended local scrap metal hunters for illegally 
salvaging ordnance from a barge on the Mekong River. Remaining ordnance 
at the site (approximately 70 metric tons), along with two other sites, were 
salvaged by government authorities and a private contractor. Salvage 
operations by scrap metal hunters have reduced the amount of EO in the rivers 
but the quality of clearance was unknown and the information management 
process was non-existent.
NTS of the Cambodian rivers has resulted in the identification of 14 sites 
where performance of technical survey operations is required. Technical 
surveys and salvage operations are complete at some sites, while other sites 
await the required technical equipment and expertise. Although the NTS 
process has been effective at identifying wreck sites, there is a gap between 
the 197 vessels identified in the desk study and the approximately 74–84 
discovered during the interview process.
Challenges
The dynamic nature of the rivers and the quality of data available about the 
location of the wrecks limited the accuracy and completeness of the NTS 
data. The sinking of the smaller wooden transport vessels has contributed to 
the discrepancy. These vessels were often destroyed much more easily than 
metal boats, resulting in the remnants of the vessels and cargo vanishing 
quickly. River sediment or flow either buried the scattered remains or washed 
them down river. The evolution of the Mekong River also explains some of the 
challenges. Several metres of sediment now bury munitions barges, which 
have been sunk for forty years. In other areas, the path of the river has moved 
up to 200 metres. As a result, some vessels are no longer located near the 
rivers. This changing environment adds complexity and inaccuracy not seen 
in land-based surveys. Although challenging, management of the process can 
create the required results.
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Analysis
An underwater NTS is different from land-based NTS in a very significant way: 
not all underwater sites contaminated with EO require clearance. For example, 
munitions buried below ten metres of sediment along an isolated section of 
the Mekong River would not be likely to make much of an impact on the local 
communities. In such a case, the survey and clearance process would expose 
personnel to unnecessary risk and waste time and resources. Before GWHF moved 
to the technical survey phase, they would assess the impact of the underwater 
EO at the sites identified.
Impact assessments are an important element in determining whether underwater 
EO clearance is worth the risk. Diving and clearance of EO are highrisk operations. 
There must be value in clearing the underwater EO, otherwise it would be more 
prudent to leave it in place and manage the sites.
TECHNICAL SURVEYS
General	policies	and	procedures
The underwater technical survey process and available technology has rapidly 
evolved over the last decade. Commercial industry has made progress with 
EO survey projects supporting marine industry such as wind farms and oil/
gas infrastructure. The military continues to make progress with naval mine 
countermeasures technology. Programmes, projects and technology developed to 
support military and commercial industry have enabled safe, efficient and effective 
technical survey operations for the mine action community. However, the scale 
and scope of military and commercial operations is often different from operations 
conducted by the mine action community.
This guide will therefore use the GICHD underwater equipment trials completed 
in 2015 to analyse best practices for the underwater technical survey process. 
Equipment trials evaluated a select set of commercial equipment suitable for 
underwater technical survey operations. In the following section, we will look 
at the various sensors and platforms available then discuss a process to analyse 
equipment needed for specific sites.
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Technical	survey	equipment
The technical survey phase of under water survey and clearance operations is 
often the least understood due to the technical nature of the work. Although there 
are limited instances when technical surveys can be accomplished using manual 
procedures (divers), it is more common that advanced sensors will be required. 
This guide concentrates on technology appropriate for use in water depths of 
50 metres or shallower. Typical sensors used in underwater technical surveys 
include the following:
• Magnetometers: these, in varying configurations, are widely considered 
the most effective sensor for detecting underwater EO. Its proximity to the 
ferrous metal in the ordnance is the basis of its ability. Magnetometers can be 
configured as a single sensor, a sensor array or in a gradiometer configuration. 
For sites that contain non-ferrous EO or sites in which the magnetometer cannot 
be deployed close enough to the seabed (due to obstructions or seabed profile), 
then a different sensor may be more effective.
• Side-scan sonar (SSS): these are a 
common tool used during the technical 
survey process but are rarely used alone 
to detect underwater EO. An SSS alone 
may be effective for sites which contain 
only large EO (such as sea mines) or EO 
contained within shipwrecks.
• Multi-beam sonar: the multi-beam sonar 
(or echo sounder) is mainly used to 
obtain bathymetry. Sonars do not need 
to be employed as close to the seabed 
as other sensors; this allows mapping of 
the depth profile and large underwater 
obstructions at the site before employing 
other sensors that must be close to the 
seabed.
• Sub-bottom profiler (SBP): an SBP 
provides a sonar image beneath the 
seabed. To date, the technology has 
limited applications in the underwater 
survey and clearance process. SBPs are 
only effective in very small survey areas 
and the data alone is rarely adequate to 
distinguish EO.
Figure 10 Deployment of a Klein 3000  
side-scan sonar for a technical survey.
Figure 9 Technical survey team preparing 
SeaQuest gradiometer for operation.
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• Electromagnetic induction (EMI): these systems (also known as pulse induction) 
are common in land-based EO surveys but employing them underwater can 
be more difficult. They are typically reserved for underwater sites that contain 
ordnance encased in non-ferrous metal or in locations with shallow water where 
manual survey is possible.
• Bore-hole magnetometers: these can be used in areas that require detection 
of buried EO beyond the capability of other magnetometers. The sensor bores 
through the seabed to detect buried EO within the area around each borehole. 
The time and effort required in this process limits the applicability of borehole 
magnetometers to very small areas.
• Optical/tactile: although less efficient and effective than other sensors, the eyes 
and hands of divers have detected underwater EO for decades. The next section 
discusses this further. Underwater cameras are also readily available. The most 
common use of cameras or divers is to verify that anomalies previously detected 
by magnetometers or sonar contacts are, in fact, ordnance.
• Other sensors: explosive and heavy metal sampling sensors are currently 
available and being adapted for use in EO surveys. As technology evolves, more 
efficient and effective sensors will become available.
Selection of the proper platform to employ the sensor is as equally important as 
sensor selection. Typical platforms include:
• Divers. Divers are rarely selected as 
the preferred ‘platform’ for the tech-
nical survey phase. They can employ 
many of the sensors described above 
but their efficiency and the inherent 
risk involved in diving would normally 
limit extensive use during technical 
survey operations. Surveying small 
areas, shallow portions or a site would 
be the most appropriate use of divers.
• Small boats or vessels. Use of small 
boats and larger vessels to mount 
or tow sonars, magnetometers and 
other sensors through the survey 
area is the most common platform 
currently in use. Proper deployment 
and navigation of the selected sensor 
is the most challenging aspect with 
small boats or other vessels.
Figure 11 A scuba diver descending with 
a Shark Marine Navigator with integrated 
metal detector.
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• Autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). 
Where cost is not a concern, AUVs 
would be a good option in a majority 
of situations. AUVs are outfitted with 
multiple sensors; SSS, multi-beam sonar, 
SBP, video cameras are all common and 
magnetometers have recently been 
added to selected AUVs. Reduced logistics requirements, improved navigational 
capabilities and efficiency are just some of the positive aspects of AUVs over 
other platforms. An AUV would not be effective in some environments, such as 
some rivers with swift currents.
• Remotely-operated vehicles (ROV). 
These provide a structure for cameras, 
sonars and, in some cases, magnetom-
eters. They can limit the need for divers 
by verifying that anomalies detected 
by other survey systems are actually 
EO. The case study will discuss the 
verification process. ROVs are also a 
great tool for exploring hazards inside 
shipwrecks or other ‘enclosed spaces’ 
which pose a significant safety risk to 
divers. ROVs provide a great option for 
reducing risk and improving efficiency 
although they are not typically used 
as the sole platform in technical survey 
operations.
• Other platforms. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) could be particularly useful 
in surveying the surf zone and areas less than one-metre water depth. Sensor 
packages are currently in development for this type of work. It is important to 
be aware of developing technology that can make operations more efficient 
and effective.
The sensors and platforms discussed in this section must be integrated into a 
system that includes accurate navigation and data collection capability. Maritime 
Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS) typically provide the required 
sub-meter accuracy for navigation. Satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS) 
are also widely available. Another primary component of the technical survey 
system is the software required to collect and analyse data. It is common to 
use different software programmes for each type of sensor used. For example, 
magnetometer data is commonly processed and analysed by a different software 
Figure 13 A Seabotix vLVB 300 ROV 
being deployed.
Figure 12 Iver3 AUV by Ocean Server.
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programme than the one used for sonar data. Software companies are making 
strides in providing an all-in-one solution capable of processing, analysing and 
displaying the data collected from the technical survey systems. There is not, 
however, a programme that currently stands out which has that capability.
Selection of technical survey equipment is dependent on site characterisation. 
A particular sensor may be suitable at one site but not suitable at another; the 
same principle applies to platforms. For example, a relatively small area, such as a 
site for bridge construction, can be effectively surveyed using divers with handheld 
metal detectors (as long as the detector has the required detection capability). In 
an area that is much larger with deeper water, such as a coastal firing range with 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), boat-towed systems with sonars and magnetometers 
would be more appropriate. Assessing equipment requirements and selection of 
suitable equipment is crucial to a successful technical survey.
Training and support requirements for technical survey operations can be 
significant. Diving, small boat operations, analysis of sonar and magnetometer 
data, equipment maintenance, etc., often require months or years of training 
to become proficient. Operational safety, efficiency and effectiveness will be 
compromised without proper equipment, training and support.
Figure 14 Marine Magnetics Explorer magnetometer towed behind an Iver3 AUV with SSS.
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CASE STUDY: GICHD UNDERWATER EQUIPMENT TRIALS 2
Background
In March 2015, the GICHD sponsored an Underwater Equipment Demon-
stration Trial to evaluate available commercial technology suitable for use in 
underwater technical surveys. The trial assessed sonar, magnetometer and 
optical sensors mounted on AUV, ROV, boat-towed and diver systems in water 
depths of 0–50 metres. Selected systems were deployed in two 100 metre by 
200 metre ranges with eleven simulated EO targets between 2 to 8 inches in 
diameter for each range. Although the demonstration was relatively limited, 
the technology and methodology used provided important information about 
available sensors and platforms for technical surveys.
Demonstrations and evaluations took place of the following systems:
• An AUV with a high frequency side scan sonar, combined with inter-
ferometric bathymetry and a total field magnetometer.
• Multi-sensor gradiometer magnetometer towed by a small boat.
• Diver underwater navigation system. This system reacquired and 
identified previously detected targets to verify that they were the simulated 
EO targets. It was not used for initial detection or ‘area survey’.
• ROV with a high frequency scanning sonar and video camera. As with 
the diver navigation system, the ROV reacquired and identified the 
simulated EO targets.
The full report is available on www.gichd.org
Successes
As has been demonstrated in other studies and operations, magnetometers 
provided the best sensor for locating individual EO during an underwater 
technical survey. Demonstrations of a boat-towed gradiometer and an 
AUV-towed magnetometer took place during the trial; both systems produced 
2 Case study information is based on author participation in the equipment trials and the 
report: Technology Demonstration Report for Underwater Survey Equipment in support of 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Technical Survey Operations, Revision 1.0, 12 November 
2015, Prepared by Orca Maritime Inc. The report is available on the GICHD website.
40 | Underwater survey and clearance operations
nearly identical results. During the ordnance identification phase, ROVs 
were more efficient and effective than the diver system in reacquiring and 
identifying the targets, particularly in water deeper than 20 metres. ROVs 
required significantly fewer logistics and less set-up time and maintenance 
than the dive systems, and the ROVs could remain at depth for significantly 
longer periods.
Standard methodology and mission planning details were also validated and 
established during the event. Technical surveys are normally conducted in 
two distinct phases. The first phase is to Survey, Classify and Map (S/C/M), 
followed by the Reacquire and Identify (R/I) phase. Usually The S/C/M phase 
is conducted using platforms that can cover a large area in a relatively short 
period. These broad-area surveys are best suited to boat-towed or AUV 
systems. Data is collected on the entire area by boats or AUVs methodically 
deploying sensors at a specified height-above-bottom and distance between 
search lanes (similar to the process of mowing a lawn). Once data from the 
sensors is processed and analysed by appropriate software systems, magnetic 
anomalies or sonar contacts are classified as either meeting the characteristics 
of the suspect ordnance or not.
Figure 15 Results of an underwater magnetometer survey. The graphic on the left 
displays processed magnetometer data. The centre graphic displays the analyst 
marks of anomalies resembling EO. The right graphic overlays the marks of the actual 
location of the simulated EO planted in the test range for the equipment trials.
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The contacts of interest (COI) are then 
mapped and made available for the 
follow-on R/I phase. In this case, the 
latitude and longitude coordinates 
were passed to divers and ROVs. 
Divers used an underwater navigation 
system, sonar and their vision to 
reacquire and identify the COIs. The 
diver system also had the capability of 
photographing the ordnance for data 
collection purposes. ROVs use sonars 
and cameras for the same purpose 
but obviously do not require a diver. 
The R/I phase is not always required during technical survey operations. If data 
collected during the S/C/M phase is of high enough quality, the R/I process 
can wait until clearance operations commence. This process is important to 
understand and the report contains a full explanation 3.
Challenges
The GICHD underwater equipment trials highlighted several challenges in 
the technical survey process. Primary among them were the limitations of 
sonars, the constraints of diver systems and the complications of conducting a 
technical survey in areas with a large amount of metallic debris. Understanding 
these challenges is important in both the selection of systems and application 
of the systems in the technical survey process.
Sonars are important sensors to most underwater technical survey operations 
but they are not normally effective in detecting individual EO. Sonars use 
sound waves to create images of the area. These images are then analysed 
to find objects that resemble the size and shape of EO or other relevant 
contacts. The equipment trials found that sonar, by itself, would be ineffective 
in detecting EO less than six inches in diameter. The inability of most sonars 
to locate buried EO (an SBP can detect EO but only in very limited scenarios) 
is another key limitation. Sonars are, however, very effective and efficient 
at finding larger EO, AXO sites, shipwrecks and obstructions. Sonars also 
provide important bathymetry and other data needed for planning the 
3 See the GICHD Underwater Equipment Demonstration report.
Figure 16 Shark Marine Navigator  
multi-function display.
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collection of technical survey data for other sensors, such as magnetometers. 
Understanding the technical capability and limitations of sensors is critical to 
a successful underwater technical survey.
The employment of divers, whether in 
the technical survey process or during 
clearance, requires an understanding 
of the associated risk and limitations. 
Diving involves inherent r isks; 
decompression sickness, arterial gas 
embolisms, and dangerous marine 
life are just a few of these. Their 
equipment and physiology limit divers. 
For example, a SCUBA diver may have 
enough breathing air in a cylinder to 
dive for ninety minutes at a water 
depth of twenty metres but the diver’s physiology is limited to one hour due 
to the risk of decompression sickness. There are also limitations for exposure 
to cold or heat.
During the GICHD underwater equipment trials, diving had to be significantly 
abbreviated because some divers could not Valsalva (or clear their ears) 
in order to descend to the seabed. Some divers were also seasick and 
supervisors were concerned about diving in the moderate weather conditions. 
To improve the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of underwater survey 
and clearance operations, it is often better to use systems that do not 
require divers, when practical. When divers are required, proper training and 
equipment is essential prior to commencing operations.
The overall purpose of an underwater technical survey is to detect and map all 
EO in a specified underwater area. This process can be particularly difficult in 
former conflict areas and firing ranges with metallic debris strewn throughout. 
Analysis of magnetometer data can filter some of the debris by eliminating 
magnetic anomalies that are outside the signature of expected EO at the 
underwater site. Other magnetic anomalies can be eliminated through analysis 
of sonar data. A problem arises, however, after filtering the technical survey 
data, when a significant number of non-EO COI remain. Understanding the 
cause of false alarms and the means to reduce false alarms is essential to a 
successful underwater technical survey.
Figure 17 Scuba diver using a Shark 
Marine Navigator system.
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The challenges highlighted in the GICHD underwater equipment trials are all 
manageable:
a.	 sonars are necessary sensors for technical surveys but they are rarely 
effective by themselves
b.	 diving operations involve risk but the risk is manageable with proper 
training and equipment, or by limiting risk by using ROVs
c.	 factors affecting the false alarm rate must be understood in order to 
produce a high quality technical survey. The technical survey process 
can be difficult but proper training, equipment and expertise will 
produce the required results.
Analysis
A standard concept of operations (CONOPS) for underwater technical surveys 
can be developed through analysis of the GICHD trials. Through a thorough 
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each sensor and platform, 
a process can be developed to employ the systems in the most effective and 
efficient manner.
Results of a NTS will provide fundamental details to begin development of a standard 
CONOPS for the technical survey process. At a minimum, the NTS should provide 
details such as type of EO in the hazard area, size of area, water depth and other 
environmental details. From these details, it is generally possible to select the 
appropriate sensors and platforms for the technical survey. In the GICHD underwater 
equipment trial example, two separate areas were used to simulate firing ranges with 
scattered UXO between 2 inches to 8 inches in diameter. The first survey area was 
located in the inner waterways with a silt and sand seabed in 1 to 5 metres of water 
depth. The second survey area was located in coastal waters with a sand seabed 
in 5 to 50 metres of water depth. Based on this limited information, it is possible to 
develop a CONOPS for the technical survey, with the following phases:
Phase 1: Broad sonar survey to collect bathymetry and map obstructions.
• A ‘high-pass’ with a sonar is often a needed step prior to deploying 
sensors close to the seabed. Without this information, it is likely that survey 
equipment would foul during phase 2 operations.
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Phase 2: Magnetometer and detailed sonar survey to detect and map EO.
• In this scenario, a sonar alone would not be effective in detecting the EO 
because of the small size of the EO and likelihood of burial. Combining 
magnetometer and sonar data provides a higher confidence in the COIs 
detected by both sensors.
Phase 3: Reacquire and identify COIs with ROV to verify that they are EO.
• This reduces the effort and risk required during follow-on clearance 
operations by reducing the number of false alarms.
At the end of the technical survey process, bathymetry, sonar, and magnetometer 
data should populate a GIS along with video/photographs of the hazard areas. 
The analysed data will provide a list of COIs with relevant data for clearance 
operations.
UNDERWATER EO CLEARANCE AND SITE MANAGEMENT
General	policies	and	procedures
The process of underwater EO clear-
ance involves much more than 
simply understanding procedures for 
ordnance disposal. Before deciding 
on the most appropriate action in an 
area contaminated with underwater 
EO, a detailed knowledge of local 
regulations and the underwater 
ecosystem is required. Local, regional 
and international policies, regulations 
and standards may limit options 
available for clearance. Under water 
environments often contain rare or 
endangered marine life, historical sites, 
war graves, sensitive infrastruc ture or 
other concerns. Planning should take these into account. Options to mitigate 
the EO may then be reduced. There are two general choices available for sites 
with underwater EO: clear the EO, or leave the EO in place and manage the site.
Figure 18 Ukraine Special Emergency Services 
scuba diver recovering AXO in the Black Sea.
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Clearance options
Clearing underwater EO has two 
options available: dispose of EO 
in situ, or recover EO for disposal at an 
alternate location. In situ disposal tends 
to be the safest option to minimise risk 
to personnel but it also has the greatest 
impact to the surrounding environment. 
The process involves initiating an 
explosive counter-charge next to the 
EO on the seabed. The underwater 
pressure wave from the explosion can 
cause secondary damage to marine 
life (particularly marine mammals), 
infrastructure and other underwater 
objects in the immediate vicinity.
When the risk to the surrounding environment is too great, it may be acceptable 
to recover the EO from the seabed for disposal at an alternate location. The 
process of recovering EO is ordinarily conducted by divers using various recovery 
techniques, such as: attaching a line to the ordnance and pulling it to the surface, 
floating the EO with a lift bag, use of cranes and barges, and even the use of 
industrial magnets in limited situations. Once recovered, the EO is transported 
to an alternate location for disposal. The problem with this option is that more 
risk is assumed by EOD personnel handling the ordnance. EO that has been fired 
or otherwise subjected to an arming sequence (UXO), or EO with sensitive main 
charges may be too hazardous to be handled by personnel. Assessment of the 
threat and risk of underwater EO should be conducted by underwater EOD experts 
in consultation with local authorities. For situations in which clearance is not safe 
or practical, site management options should be considered.
Site Management options
There are many instances when the relatively limited impact of underwater EO in 
an area does not justify the associated risk of clearing the ordnance. There are also 
times when funding is not available or regulations do not support underwater EO 
clearance. In these cases, site management would be the only remaining option. 
The process generally involves marking the area on nautical charts, restricting 
activities such as fishing, dredging and development and periodic monitoring 
Figure 19 Vietnamese military team 
recovers EO at bridge construction site.
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of the site to reassess the threat and risk. The SS Richard Montgomery, sunk in 
the Thames Estuary, is a well-known example of an underwater EO site that is 
managed in this manner. Germany is also known to manage many underwater 
AXO dump sites. In Kiel, underwater AXO sites are routinely mapped with sonar 
to monitor the location and condition of the ordnance. Germany also moves 
underwater EO from shipping channels and ship anchorages to some of the 
designated underwater dump sites that originated after the Second World War.
Another option is to accept the risk of underwater EO. As discussed in the 
section on risk, marine dredging typically accepts the risk of ordnance smaller 
than a specified diameter during operations. Ordnance detection and response 
procedures are actioned, in this option, to remove and dispose of found EO.
CASE STUDY: OPERATION RENDER SAFE 4
Background
Advanced militaries have long maintained capability to survey and clear under-
water EO. NGOs and commercial organisations have only recently begun 
underwater clearance operations. In many cases, advanced military forces still 
provide the most effective capability for clearance. Training and experience 
4 Case study information is based on discussions with Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force EOD teams and ADF personnel.
Figure 20 RENDER SAFE operation area.
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required of clearance divers can be extensive and require several years to 
develop a robust capability. Investment in such a capability is often reserved 
for military forces.
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) leads an ongoing multinational force 
operation every year in the Pacific islands to support EO clearance originating 
from the Second World War. The operation, entitled RENDER SAFE, includes 
military support from the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
Canada and the Solomon Islands (SI). RENDER SAFE commenced in 2009 
and has included deployments to Nauru in October 2010, Solomon Islands 
in November 2010 and 2013, Vanuatu during January to February 2011, and 
Papua New Guinea, first in Rabaul, from October to November 2011, then 
on the Kokoda Track in October 2011, and finally in the district of Torokina in 
2014. The operation has cleared hundreds of sites and disposed of tens of 
thousands of ordnance items. This case study includes details and discussion 
of the operation conducted in the Solomon Islands in 2013.
From 28 October to 6 December 2013, 
Operation RENDER SAFE com pleted EO 
clearance activities on Guadalcanal, 
Tulagi Harbour and Russell Islands in 
areas identified by the SI government. 
Operations were partnered with the 
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
(RSIPF) EOD teams. This partnership 
assisted in overcoming language 
gaps and provided enhanced local 
knowledge on ordnance problems and 
disposal techniques. 12,164 explosive 
items with a net explosive weight of 
6,851 kilograms were cleared during 
the period.
Successes
Underwater EO clearance operations during RENDER SAFE in 2013 were 
successful in many aspects. The primary achievement was making SI 
communities safer through the removal of ERW. The operation also provided 
valuable capability development opportunities for RSIPF EOD teams. The RSIPF 
became aware of the training and equipment required to conduct underwater 
Figure 21 RSIPF using a mobile cutting 
system to cut ordnance before disposal 
in a burn pit.
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clearance and was able to obtain 
support from the U.S. to fill some of 
their needs. The U.S. Department of 
Defense Humanitarian Mine Action 
(HMA) programme provided RSIPF 
with scuba diving equipment and 
training. More recently, the HMA 
programme provided technical survey 
equipment and training. RSIPF EOD 
teams have proven their capability. 
As a result, they have been invited by 
ADF to support future RENDER SAFE 
operations throughout the region.
The ADF also demonstrated profi-
ciency in coordinating multinational 
force participation in the operation. 
Although ADF encountered difficul-
ties, it is unlikely that a non-military 
organisation could have coordinated 
the planning, operations and logistics 
required to support such an extensive 
clearance operation. In some cases, 
underwater clearance operations are 
more challenging in the Pacific region 
due to remoteness and limitations 
with logistics. However, even in more accessible areas, substantial coordina-
tion must take place in order to safely and effectively conduct operations. 
The ADF used their wide-ranging resources to provide medical support to 
diving and explosive operations, recompression chambers for diving casual-
ties in case of an emergency and, most importantly, EOD experts to ensure 
EO disposal operations protected personnel, property and the environment. 
Throughout the operation, the ADF provided the required leadership to safely 
and effectively coordinate and manage activities.
Australian Clearance Dive Teams (CDT) primarily conducted the under water 
EO clearance activities of RENDER SAFE. The CDT disposed of the EO in situ,  
recovered the EO for disposal at an alternate location, or, in rare 
circumstances, moved the underwater EO to deep-water dump sites. 
The CDT are highly experienced. Their knowledge and experience in 
Figure 22 In situ disposal of underwater 
EO during Operation RENDER SAFE.
Figure 23 Scuba divers preparing disposal 
charges during Operation RENDER SAFE.
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diving, demolition and EOD oper-
ations allowed them to rapidly 
assess and se lec t  the proper 
disposal method based on a risk 
analys is  f ramework.  Tra ining, 
experience and professionalism of 
advanced military forces and similar 
government organisations establishes 
a standard for underwater clearance 
tasks; anything less could result 
in unacceptable risk to operations 
and surrounding communities.
Challenges
A common challenge to RENDER SAFE operations is the time and effort 
expended on the NTS process once forces have arrived on site. ADF relied 
heavily on the SI government to identify sites with EO contamination. It would 
be more efficient to complete the NTS process before deploying an entire 
RENDER SAFE contingent. Allocating personnel to complete a NTS during 
the scheduled reconnaissance phase or site survey, will provide more defined 
Figure 24 Transportation of bombs 
recovered during Operation RENDER  
SAFE to an alternate disposal location.
Figure 25 Heat map representing ERW in the Pacific from the Second World War. 
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areas for clearance and enable a more efficient use of resources when 
clearance teams are available.
For decades, the Pacific has had a problem with information management for 
EO clearance. Clearance operations have taken place throughout the Pacific 
islands since the end of World War II yet documentation has seldom been 
undertaken. CDTs expended time and effort during RENDER SAFE searching 
for underwater EO at sites with known contamination, only to find out that 
other military clearance teams had previously cleared the areas. Clearance 
data collected during Operation RENDER SAFE is also only accessible to 
the ADF. A regional IM system at the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat was 
proposed on several occasions but has not yet been put in place or funded. 
Inefficient duplicated clearance operations will continue until a regional IM 
system is instituted.
Analysis
Risk to personnel, property and environment is greater in the clearance phase 
than in the previous survey phases. As a result, the requirement for adequate 
training and equipment is critically important. Diving operations are often a 
requirement for underwater EO clearance; even basic scuba dive training involves 
a substantial commitment of time and resources. Advanced dive training and 
support requirements are more onerous. Extensive investment in training and 
equipment is required for small boats or larger vessels. EOD procedures normally 
conducted on land become much more difficult underwater. Special training is 
needed for explosive demolition materials, equipment and procedures. These 
few examples highlight the commitment required to develop and maintain teams 
proficient in underwater EO clearance operations.
An analysis must be conducted to determine whether that country should develop 
their own underwater EOD capability or contract a commercial company for 
clearance, when there is extensive underwater contamination in their waters. 
Development of this capability is a significant process that could take up to a 
decade and a large amount of funding to mature to full capability (See section on 
Training and Equipment Requirements). A capability development programme is 
generally the best option when a country already has a capability for underwater 
EO clearance and only advanced training or equipment is required. Commercial 
underwater clearance can also be very expensive but clearance can be relatively 
quick and efficient if funding is available.
CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Underwater survey and clearance of EO can be a difficult and expensive task. 
Solving underwater EO problems in vastly different areas cannot be achieved 
through a one-size-fits-all approach. Assessment of an area’s problem, along with 
evaluation of the required capability for survey and clearance, will be useful in 
developing a plan to progress operations. As technology changes and capabilities 
mature, more options will become available although current choices are limited. A 
few mine action non-governmental organisations (NGO) have explored underwater 
EOD operations; commercial companies have made remarkable progress with 
technical surveys; and government organisations generally maintain the most 
capable clearance capacity. However, a single organisation with a full-range of 
capabilities is rare.
The mine action community has developed and mastered the NTS process through 
decades of clearing landmines and other explosive ordnance. Organisations 
with such detailed knowledge and experience, combined with underwater EOD 
experts, would be best suited to complete an NTS for areas with underwater EO. 
Commercial organisations are capable in undertaking desk studies and militaries 
often have access to databases with information required during the NTS process. 
However, mine action organisations are generally more proficient in on-the-ground 
NTS activities. Applying the NTS approach to underwater operations provides an 
opportunity to improve efficiencies.
In recent years, the offshore energy industry has significantly progressed tech-
nology suitable for use in underwater EO technical surveys. Companies have 
since used sonars and magnetometers to detect and map EO in coastal waters, 
rivers and lakes in support of commercial development activities. The technology 
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continues to mature and commercial organisations have often maintained an 
advantage in providing the most efficient and effective systems and processes 
for underwater TS operations.
Advanced military and government organisations continue to be best suited to 
clearance tasks. Extensive training, equipment and support requirements for 
underwater clearance require investment and commitment that is difficult to 
establish and maintain outside of government organisations. There are some 
commercial bodies with clearance capabilities but most fully capable underwater 
EOD teams are organised, trained and funded through government resources.
Understanding and applying experience from the mine action community, 
commercial industry and advanced militaries is key to the development and 
implementation of a successful underwater EO survey and clearance programme. 
Whether planning to develop a capability within a government organisation or 
simply contract a commercial business for the work, underwater operations will 
require a considerable investment. Before deciding on a solution, it is best to have 
an expert assess the underwater EO areas to provide advice and recommendations 
for future survey and clearance tasks.
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ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
• Technology Demonstration Report for Underwater Survey Equipment in 
support of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Technical Survey Operations. 
(rev 1.0)
Author: Orca Maritime Inc.
Publisher: GICHD
Date of publication: November 2015
• Assessment and Management of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk in 
the Marine Environment.
Author: Cooper, N and Cooke, S
Publisher: CIRIA
Date of publication: September 2015
• Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO) and Munitions Diving (Z275.6-11).
Publisher: Canadian Standards Association
Date of publication: August 2011
• A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge – Fifth Edition.
Publisher: Project Management Institute
Date of publication: 2013
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• IMAS 07.11 Land release
• IMAS 07.30 Accreditation of demining organisations and operations
• IMAS 08.10 Non-technical survey
• IMAS 08.30 Post-clearance documentation
• IMAS 09.11 Battle Area Clearance (BAC)
• IMAS 09.30 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
• IMAS 09.60 Underwater Survey and Clearance of Explosive Ordnance
• IMAS 10.20 S&OH – Demining worksite safety
• IMAS 10.70 S&OH – Protection of the environment
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